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SEIZURE LAW 
Emil A. Tonkovich* 
This article surveys significant trends in search and seizure law.1 
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions are reviewed. The 
scope of this survey is limited to the following four areas: (1) fourth 
amendment protected interests; (2) the probable cause requirement; 
(3) the automobile exception to the warrant requirement; and (4) 
the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. These four ar-
eas were selected because of their practical and doctrinal 
significance. 
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTED INTERESTS 
The fourth amendment protects individuals against unreasonable 
searches and seizures by the government.2 In the landmark case of Katz v. United States,3 the United States Supreme Court held that 
this protection applies to any interest in which an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The expectation of privacy must 
be both subjective and one that society recognizes as reasonable.4 
The Katz decision shifted the focus of constitutional protection 
from physical areas to privacy interests. Thus, the fourth amend-
ment "protects people, not places." 6 During the past two years, the 
Court has decided several cases involving the fundamental issue of 
protected interests. 
In Oliver v. United States,6 the Court considered whether, under 
the Katz test, fourth amendment protections extend to open fields. 
* Professor of Law, University of Kansas. J.D. 1977, summa cum laude, Notre Dame. 
1 Excerpts from other publications written by the author are included in this article. 
2 The fourth amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV. 
8 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967). 
4 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
8 Id. a t 351. The Court later conformed its fourth amendment standing test to Katz by 
rejecting property concepts and requiring defendants to have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the area searched or the object seized. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 
(1978). 
6 466 U.S. 170 (1QR^ 
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In Oliver, narcotics agents received reports that the defendant was 
raising marijuana on his farm. The agents conducted a warrantless 
search on foot of the farm area and found a marijuana field over a 
mile from the defendant's home. The field was secluded and could 
not be seen from any point of public access. The defendant had 
locked the entrance gate to his farm and posted "no trespassing" 
signs. 7 
The Court held that the search was lawful, concluding that no 
legitimate expectation of privacy per se exists in open fields.8 The 
expectation of privacy in an open field is not one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Therefore, although the de-
fendant treated his secluded marijuana field as an area of private 
use, erecting barriers and "no trespassing" signs, those actions 
could not convert his subjective expectation of privacy into a legiti-
mate interest protected by the fourth amendment. 9 
During its last term, in the companion cases of California v. 
Ciraolo10 and Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,11 the Court con-
sidered the impact of aerial surveillance on privacy expectations. 
Both cases were analyzed under the Katz test. 
In Ciraolo, police received a tip that the defendant was growing 
marijuana in his backyard. The backyard was completely enclosed 
by two tall fences. The police flew over the yard in public airspace 
and, without visual assistance, observed vegetation that appeared to 
be marijuana plants. This led to the issuance of a search warrant 
and the subsequent seizure of the plants. 1 2 
The Court held that the search was lawful because the defen-
dant's expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable. The 
defendant demonstrated his subjective expectation of privacy under 
the Katz test by fencing his marijuana crop. The Court reasoned, 
however, that the defendant's expectation was unreasonable be-
cause anyone flying in the same public airspace could have seen the 
marijuana plants. 1 3 
In Dow, the Court held that it was not a fourth amendment 
search to engage in conventional aerial photography of the outdoor 
areas of a large industrial complex.1 4 The Court, however, hinted 
that the result might be different if the surveillance involved highly 
sophisticated equipment. 1 5 Furthermore, the Court's emphasis on 
the lower expectation of privacy in commercial facilities indicated 
that even conventional aerial photography, which enhances the na-
7 Id. at 173-74. 
8 Id. at 182-83. Thus, the Court reaffirmed the "open fields" doctrine of Hester v. 
United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), which held that police officers may enter and search a 
field without a warrant. 
9 See 466 U.S. at 182-83. 
1 0 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986). 
1 1 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). 
1 2 106 S. Ct. at 1809-10. 
1 3 Id. a t 1813. 
1 4 106 S. Ct. at 1827. 
1 5 Id. a t 1826. 
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ked eye, might be prohibited in Ciraolo-type private residence 
searches. 1 6 
Oliver, Ciraolo, and Dow demonstrate the Court's adherence to 
the Katz test. Although the conclusions in these cases may be dis-
puted, 1 7 the Court's analyses are consistent with Katz. Thus, the 
fourth amendment protection continues to apply to any interest in 
which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
II. PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENT 
Generally, searches and seizures must be based on probable 
cause and made pursuant to a warrant. 1 8 Probable cause to search 
exists when there are sufficient facts, given the totality of the cir-
cumstances, to lead a reasonable person to believe that there is a 
fair probability that the items sought are connected with criminal 
activity and will be present at the time and place of the search. 1 9 
This traditional standard has been reaffirmed by the Court in re-
cent decisions. 
In Illinois v. Gates,20 the Court examined whether the strict 
Aguilar-Spinelli21 test should be replaced by the traditional "total-
ity of the circumstances" standard when evaluating informant in-
formation for probable cause. In Gates, the Bloomingdale, Illinois 
Police Department received an anonymous letter that stated the de-
fendants were selling illegal drugs. The letter described in detail the 
routine the defendants followed in traveling to Florida, picking up 
the drugs, and returning to Bloomingdale where they sold them. 
According to the letter, the defendants transported over $100,000 
in drugs per trip. The informant further claimed that the defen-
dants had over $100,000 in drugs in the basement of their home. 2 2 
On the basis of the information in the letter, police corroboration 
of many of its details, and police surveillance of the defendants' 
suspected drug-buying trip to Florida, a search warrant was issued 
for the defendants' car and residence. The searches revealed 350 
pounds of marijuana in the car, and marijuana, weapons, and other 
contraband in the home. All of these items were eventually sup-
pressed on the ground that the affidavit for the search warrant 
failed the Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause. 2 3 
The Court rejected the strict interpretation of the Aguilar-
16 See id. 
1 7 For a critical analysis of these cases, see Note, Aerial Surveillance and the Fourth 
Amendment, infra at page 57. 
1 8 U.S. CONST, amend. IV. 
1 9 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
2 0 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
2 1 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 
(1964). 
2 2 462 U.S. at 225-28. 
2 3 Id. 
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Spinelli test and reversed the lower court's suppression of the evi-
dence. T h e Aguilar-Spinelli test required that an affidavit establish 
the means by which the informant acquired his information and the 
veracity of the informant or the reliability of his information. The 
Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test, refusing to bind the 
concept of probable cause to such a strict set of rules. The Court 
explained that veracity or credibility should not be analyzed sepa-
rately, but should be considered with the basis of knowledge in a 
practical, common sense analysis of the totality of the cir-
cumstances . 2 4 
In New York v. P.J. Video, Inc.,26 the Court next examined the 
impact of first amendment considerations on the "fair probability" 
probable cause standard. P.J. Video involved the seizure of alleg-
edly pornographic films pursuant to a search warrant. The support-
ing affidavit described "patently offensive" sex acts depicted in the 
f i lms. 2 6 
Although the seizure of materials presumptively protected by the 
first amendment raises special concerns, the Court held that the 
"fair probability" standard of probable cause is sufficient.27 The 
Court emphasized, however, that the defendant is entitled to a 
prompt postseizure judicial determination of probable cause and 
that a warrant for presumptively protected materials requires more 
than the officer's conclusions that the materials are obscene.2 8 
Gates and P.J. Video demonstrate the Court's reaffirmation of 
the traditional probable cause standard. Although these cases raise 
distinctive issues, the Court reasoned that a higher standard of 
probable cause was unwarranted. 
I I I . AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT 
Probable cause searches of vehicles generally do not require a 
warrant. This long-standing exception to the warrant requirement is 
justified on two grounds. First, the inherent mobility of vehicles 
often creates exigent circumstances that make obtaining a warrant 
impractical . 2 9 Second, there is a lower expectation of privacy in 
M Id. at 238. The Court, however, stated that the "reliability" and "basis of knowl-
e d g e " prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test are highly relevant factors in the "totality of the 
c i r cums tances" analysis. Id. Thus , while the Court has relaxed these requirements, the 
two fac tors should not be completely disregarded when analyzing probable cause. 
" 106 S. Ct . 1610 (1986). 
" Id. at 1613 (quoting People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 566, 570-71, 493 
N . Y . S . 2 d 988, 992, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 1124 (1985)). 
2 7 Id. at 1615-16 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983)). See also supra 
text accompanying notes 18-19. 
" 106 S. Ct . at 1614 (citing Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973)). 
" Carrol l v. United States 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925). 
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vehicles. 3 0 
Automobile exception searches are often poorly executed by po-
lice. This is due, in part, to the unsettled law in this relatively con-
fusing area. 
In the 1982 decision of United States v. Ross,31 the Court at-
tempted to clarify the scope of these searches. The Court held that 
if probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it 
justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that 
may conceal the object of the search. 3 2 Thus, Ross extended the 
scope of the automobile exception beyond the vehicle's integral 
parts to include containers within the vehicle. 
Although Ross clarified the scope of automobile exception 
searches, the search of containers pursuant to this exception re-
mains unsettled. The Court in Ross clearly stated that if the proba-
ble cause is directed at the vehicle, police may search containers 
that may conceal the object of the search. 3 3 Furthermore, the Court 
reaffirmed that the automobile exception does not apply to situa-
tions in which the probable cause is directed at a container that is 
subsequently placed in a vehicle. 3 4 The Court, however, has not 
specifically addressed whether the automobile exception applies to 
situations in which the probable cause is directed solely at a 
container that is already in a vehicle. 3 5 
In 1985, the Court decided two automobile exception cases. The 
first case, United States v. Johns,36 involved a delayed automobile 
exception search of packages. Johns offered insight into the Court's 
position on the scope of container searches pursuant to the automo-
bile exception. The second case, California v. Carney,37 resulted in 
a controversial decision involving the types of vehicles covered 
under the automobile exception. 
In Johns, DEA agents followed the defendants to a remote air-
strip and seized two trucks that they had probable cause to believe 
contained marijuana. The agents removed packages from the trucks 
and placed them in a government warehouse. Three days later, 
without obtaining a search warrant, the agents opened the packages 
and found marijuana. 3 8 
The Court held that the search did not violate the fourth amend-
ment. Relying on Ross, the Court held that the agents could have 
30 See id. at 151-62. 
3 1 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
3 2 Id. at 824. 
3 3 Id. at 820-24. 
34 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 
1 (1977). In these situations, police may seize the container, but must obtain a warrant to 
search it. 442 U.S. at 766-67; 433 U.S. at 13-14. 
3 6 In Oklahoma v. Castleberry, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (per curiam), an equally divided 
Court affirmed a decision that in this situation police must detain the container and delay 
the search until a warrant is obtained. 
3 6 469 U.S. 478 (1985). 
3 7 471 U.S. 386 (1985). 
3 8 469 U.S. at 480-81. 
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lawfully searched the packages when they first seized them at the 
airstrip. Since the agents lawfully seized the packages and contin-
ued to have probable cause to believe they contained contraband, a 
three-day delay in the execution of the warrantless search was not 
unreasonable. The Court reasoned that it would not further an indi-
vidual's privacy interests to require a warrant for a subsequent 
search not conducted at the place of seizure. 3 9 
On the surface, Johns merely extended Chambers v. Maroney40 
to the search of containers. The decision, however, also shed light 
on the unsettled scope of container searches pursuant to the auto-
mobile exception. The Court in Johns stressed that the search was 
within the automobile exception because the probable cause was di-
rected at not only the packages but also the vehicles themselves. 4 1 
Thus, by implication, the automobile exception does not apply to 
situations in which the probable cause is directed solely at a 
container that is already in a vehicle. 
In Carney, the other 1985 case, the Court attempted to define the 
types of vehicles covered under the automobile exception. DEA 
agents had information that the defendant was exchanging mari-
juana for sex in his motor home parked in a public lot. The agents 
watched the defendant approach a youth who then entered the mo-
tor home with the defendant. When the youth emerged, he told the 
agents that the defendant gave him marijuana in exchange for sex-
ual contacts. The agents convinced the youth to return to the motor 
home and to ask the defendant to come out. When the defendant 
stepped out, an agent entered the motor home, found marijuana, 
and arrested the defendant. 4 2 
The Court held that the search did not violate the fourth amend-
ment, finding it lawful under the "automobile exception" to the 
warrant requirement. The Court explained that motor homes, like 
automobiles, are mobile. Also, there is a diminished expectation of 
privacy in a motor home that is operated on public roads and in 
public areas. The Court rejected the argument that the exception 
did not apply simply because the motor home was equipped to func-
tion as a residence. In this case, the motor home was licensed to 
operate on public streets, was serviced in public places, was found 
in a public parking lot, and was subject to extensive regulation and 
inspection not applicable to a residence. The Court refused to cre-
ate fine distinctions in the automobile exception based on the size of 
the vehicle and its purported use. 4 3 
The variety of vehicles combined with a myriad of factual situa-
3 9 Id. at 486-87. 
4 0 3 99 U.S. 42 (1970). The Court in Chambers held that a vehicle may be searched 
pursuant to the automobile exception after it has been impounded at the police station. Id. 
at 52. Thus, Johns updated the Chambers decision to conform with the search of contain-
ers permitted in Ross. 
4 1 469 U.S. at 486. 
4 2 471 U.S. at 387-88. 
4 3 Id. at 390-94. 
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tions will undoubtedly create gray areas as to the types of vehicles 
covered under the automobile exception. Carney, however, has pro-
vided guidelines that will assist in analyzing these gray areas.4 4 
I V . " GOOD FAITH" EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLU-
SIONARY RULE 
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that prohib-
its the use of evidence obtained by police through means that vio-
late the defendant's fourth amendment rights. 4 8 Limitations on the 
controversial rule prevent its strict application. The "good faith" 
exception is the most recent limitation on the rule. 
In the companion cases of United States v. Leon46 and Massa-
chusetts v. Sheppard,47 the Supreme Court adopted the "good 
f a i t h" exception to the exclusionary rule. The "good faith" excep-
tion set forth in these cases is limited to search warrant situations. 
Although the practical impact of these cases is speculative, from a 
doctrinal standpoint they are perhaps the most significant criminal 
cases decided by the Burger Court. 
In Leon, police successfully searched the defendants' residences 
and automobiles for drugs pursuant to a facially valid search war-
rant . The affidavit contained both specific information from a confi-
dential informant of unproven reliability and extensive surveillance 
tha t indicated drug trafficking. 4 8 
The defendants were indicted for federal drug offenses and 
moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. The 
district court granted the motions in part, concluding that the affi-
davit was insufficient to establish probable cause. Although the 
court found that the police had acted in good faith, it rejected the 
Government's suggestion to recognize a "good faith" exception to 
the exclusionary rule. The court of appeals affirmed, also refusing 
to recognize the exception. The Government's petition for certiorari 
presented only the question whether a "good faith" exception to the 
exclusionary rule should be recognized. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, recognized the "good faith" exception, and ac-
4 4 We need not pass on the application of the vehicle exception to a motor home 
that is situated in a way or place that objectively indicates that it is being used 
as a residence. Among the factors that might be relevant in determining 
whether a warrant would be required in such a circumstance is its location, 
whether the vehicle is readily mobile or instead, for instance, elevated on 
blocks, whether the vehicle is licensed, whether it is connected to utilities, and 
whether it has convenient access to a public road. 
Id. a t 394 n.3. 
" See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). 
4 6 4 68 U.S. 897 (1984). 
4 7 468 U.S. 981 (1984). 
4 8 468 U.S. at 901-02. 
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cordingly, reversed the decision of the court of appeals. 4 9 
Underlying the Court's recognition of the "good faith" exception 
was its basic conception of the exclusionary rule. The Court empha-
sized that the rule is not constitutional in origin, but rather a judi-
cially created remedy designed primarily to protect fourth amend-
ment rights through its deterrent effect. 6 0 Accordingly, the Court 
has restricted the rule's application to those situations in which its 
deterrent purpose is effectively served. 6 1 Using a cost-benefit analy-
sis in applying the rule, 6 2 the Court weighs the cost of losing relia-
ble and probative evidence against the benefit of deterring fourth 
amendment violations. 6 3 Applying this cost-benefit analysis, the 
Court has rejected the application of the rule in a variety of 
situations. 5 4 
The Court employed the cost-benefit analysis to support its recog-
nition of the "good faith" exception in search warrant cases. 6 6 After 
noting that the exclusionary rule is not directed at judicial conduct, 
the Court reasoned that the rule cannot deter objectively reasonable 
law enforcement activity. 6 6 This is particularly true when a police 
officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search war-
rant from a judge and acted within its scope. 6 7 Thus, the Court 
concluded that the application of the exclusionary rule to these situ-
ations cannot logically deter fourth amendment violations. 6 8 
Applying these principles, the Court in Leon found the "good 
fai th" exception appropriate. Despite the lower courts' findings of 
no probable cause, the search warrant affidavit contained the results 
of an extensive investigation that arguably may have established 
probable cause. 6 9 Under these circumstances, the officers' reliance 
on the magistrate's erroneous determination of probable cause was 
4 8 Id. at 902-05. 
6 0 Id. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
5 1 Id. at 909. 
5 2 Id. at 906-07. 
8 3 See id. at 909-10. 
6 4 Id. at 909. For example, the exclusionary rule has been held not applicable to grand 
jury proceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974); civil proceed-
ings, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449-54 (1976); and impeachment at trial, 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1971). Furthermore, the Court has applied 
the cost-benefit analysis to procedurally limit the impact of the exclusionary rule. For 
example, the Court drastically limited fourth amendment federal habeas relief, Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-95 (1976), and limited standing to invoke the rule in fourth 
amendment cases to defendants who have actually suffered a violation of their own rights, 
Rakas v. Illinois, 349 U.S. 128, 138-40 (1978). 
6 8 468 U.S. at 913. 
5 6 Id. at 916. 
67 Id. at 920. 
8 8 Id. at 921. The Court emphasized that the "good faith" exception is not applicable 
under any of the following circumstances: the judge issuing the warrant was misled by 
false information in the affidavit that was knowingly or recklessly included by the police; 
the issuing judge abandoned his neutral and detached role; the affidavit was so lacking in 
probable cause as to render belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; or the warrant is 
so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things 
to be seized—that the police cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Id. at 923. 
8 8 Id. at 925-26. 
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objectively reasonable. 6 0 Accordingly, the application of the exclu-
sionary rule to this case was inappropriate 6 1 
Sheppard, on the other hand, involved the application of the 
"good faith" exception to a situation in which the search warrant 
established probable cause but was technically defective. Based on 
information gathered in a homicide investigation, a police detective 
drafted a search warrant affidavit. The affidavit requested authority 
to search the defendant's residence for certain described items, in-
cluding the victim's clothing and a blunt instrument that might 
have been the murder weapon. The district attorney and his first 
assistant approved the affidavit. Because it was Sunday, the detec-
tive could not find an appropriate warrant application form and, 
consequently, used a controlled substances form. After making 
some changes in the form, the detective presented it and the affida-
vit to a judge at his residence. The detective told the judge that the 
warrant form might need further modifications. The judge found 
that the affidavit established probable cause and told the detective 
that the necessary changes in the warrant form would be made. 6 2 
Although the judge made some further changes, the warrant con-
tinued to authorize a search for controlled substances and failed to 
incorporate the affidavit. After signing the warrant, the judge re-
turned it and the affidavit to the detective, assuring him that it was 
proper in form and content. The search of the defendant's residence 
was limited to the items listed on the affidavit, and police seized 
several pieces of incriminating evidence. 6 3 
After being charged with first-degree murder, the defendant 
moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the warrant did 
not particularly describe the items to be seized. The trial court 
agreed, but denied the motion because the police acted in good 
faith. At the subsequent trial, the defendant was convicted. On ap-
peal, the state supreme court refused to recognize the "good faith" 
exception and reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, applied the "good faith" exception, and accordingly, 
reversed 6 4 
Having recognized the "good faith" exception in Leon, the only 
issue before the Court in Sheppard was whether the police reasona-
bly believed that the search was authorized by a valid warrant. 6 8 It 
was undisputed that the officers believed the warrant was valid. 6 6 
Regarding the objective reasonableness of the officers' belief, the 
Court found that they "took every step that could reasonably be 
expected of them." 6 7 The Court concluded that to suppress the evi-
Id. at 926. 
" Id. 
** 468 U.S. at 984-86. 
Id. at 986-87. 
" Id. at 987, 991. 
6 8 Id. at 987-88. 
•e Id. at 988. 
6 7 Id. at 989. 
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dence because of the judicial error demonstrated in this case would 
not serve the exclusionary rule's deterrent function. 6 8 Thus, applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule was inappropriate. 6 9 
The "good faith" exception set forth in Leon and Sheppard is a 
logical extension of the Court's cost-benefit approach to the judi-
cially created exclusionary rule. Suppression of evidence obtained 
by police through objective good faith reliance on a search warrant 
does not effectively serve the rule's deterrent purpose. Critics of the 
"good faith" exception, on the other hand, believe that the cost-
benefit approach is illusory because the exclusionary rule is implicit 
in the fourth amendment and, therefore, constitutional in nature. 
Unless the cost-benefit analysis is applied, however, the exclusion-
ary rule would be rigidly enforced. It is illogical to rigidly apply the 
rule to situations in which its deterrent purpose is not appreciably 
served. Irrational applications of the rule do not promote constitu-
tional rights, but rather, generate disrespect for the criminal justice 
system. 
The exclusionary rule, even when rationally applied, impedes the 
truth-finding process by excluding probative and reliable evidence 
and occasionally permits the guilty to go free. Application of the 
rule to situations in which the police have relied in objective good 
faith on a defective search warrant is not only illogical, but also 
grants an unwarranted windfall to criminal defendants. Conse-
quently, the narrow "good faith" exception set forth in Leon and 
Sheppard is a logical and necessary limitation on the exclusionary 
rule. 7 0 
V. CONCLUSION 
The cases in these four areas reflect the trend in search and 
seizure law. Fundamental fourth amendment doctrine has returned 
to the basics. Protected interests are now founded on fourth amend-
ment principles of privacy rather than arcane principles of property. 
The traditional standard of probable cause has been reaffirmed. In 
specific areas, such as the automobile exception, the Court has at-
tempted to clarify the law—usually in favor of law enforcement. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court has taken a prag-
matic approach to the exclusionary rule and has limited the rule's 
impact by applying a cost-benefit analysis. 
6 8 Id. at 990-91. 
68 Id. at 991. 
7 0 If, contrary to logical expectations, the "good faith" exception results in a significant 
increase in fourth amendment violations, the Court should reconsider its decisions in Leon 
and Sheppard. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring). It is unlikely, how-
ever, that violations will significantly increase. Furthermore, it is possible that fourth 
amendment violations will actually decrease because police have an additional incentive to 
obtain search warrants under the "good faith" exception. 
